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1 Introduction
It is rare for a program overview in theoretical physics to be deeply philosophical,
to oﬀer a broadly-based, sustained meditation about what the formal results that
have been and are hoped to be obtained might mean. Christopher Fuchs has given
us such a paper: QBism: The perimeter of quantum Bayesianism (Fuchs 2010;
unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from this paper). Fuchs deﬁnes
QBism as the view that quantum theory is not something outside probability
theory ... but rather it is an addition to probability theory (p. 9; emphasis in
original). Speciﬁcally, quantum theory is proposed to be an addition to personal,
Bayesian, normative probability theory (p. 19), the particular variant of proba-
bility theory in which probabilities are individual degrees of belief and are not
in any sense objective facts about the world outside of some individual reasoning
agent's head. For the QBist, quantum states are not objective states of the world,
and quantum information is not objective information about the world: quantum
states are (just) quantum information, and quantum information is information
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for a speciﬁc, individual observer about the consequences (for me) of my ac-
tions upon the physical system (p. 7; emphasis in original). While Fuchs derides
stale, lifeless philosophy (p. 10) when advertising the theorem-proving prowess
of the QBist movement, QBism: The perimeter of quantum Bayesianism is
straightforwardly philosophical, embracing such false-started philosophies of 100
years ago (p. 1, Abstract) as meliorism and pragmatism, quoting William James
almost as extensively as Einstein, and concluding that QBism hints of a world,
a pluriverse, that consists of an all-pervasive `pure experience'  (p. 27).
While the scope of QBism: The perimeter of quantum Bayesianism is quite
broad, two principal themes stand out. The ﬁrst is the role of measurement
interactions, implemented by positive operator-valued measures (POVMs; for
deﬁnitions, see Fuchs 2002, Sect. 4 or Nielsen/Chaung 2000, Ch. 2), in updat-
ing observers' beliefs about the world. The second is an elaboration of Fuchs'
proposal, ﬁrst made in Fuchs 2002, that the physical, as opposed to purely
mathematical, content of quantum theory concerns the inﬂuence of the dimen-
sion d, formerly Hilbert-space dimension (p. 1, Abstract), of a physical sys-
tem on its observable behavior. These themes provide a realist counterpoint
to the instrumentalism about quantum states that is the most well-known and
widely-discussed feature of QBism (Caves/Fuchs/Schack, 2002a; Caves/Fuchs/
Schack, 2002b; Caves/Fuchs/Schack, 2007; Palge/Konrad, 2008; Timpson, 2008;
Friederich, 2011; Fuchs/Schack, 2011b). Fuchs discusses the metaphysical and
ontological questions raised by these realist themes with special emphasis on the
view's outer edges (p. 1, Abstract), and in terms that are considerably more
philosophically pugnacious than those employed even in his own earlier writings.
He provides his own versions of a number of arguments also made by others,
defending QBism from charges of solipsism, resolving the question of how appa-
ratus are to be deﬁned in QBism by treating them as prosthetic extensions of
observers, and outlining a decidedly non-instrumentalist QBist account of scien-
tiﬁc explanation. Perhaps in response to the proposal of Timpson (2008) that
QBism requires an ontology along the anti-determinist lines of Cartwright (1999),
Fuchs emphasizes the objective indeterminism of the QBist universe, and employs
the terms autonomous and creation to characterize quantum systems and pro-
cesses, respectively. Perhaps in response to Timpson's argument that QBist anti-
determinism nonetheless does not entail a Jamesian pragmatism, Fuchs explicitly
endorses James' position, an endorsement foreshadowed by his earlier remark
that I should work a little harder to make myself look Jamesian (Fuchs 2002,
Acknowledgments). To assure that no one doubts the seriousness of his most sig-
niﬁcant ontological claim, he puts it in capitals: QUANTUM STATES DO NOT
EXIST (p. 2; emphasis in original). It is surely unfair to attribute to all instru-
mentalists about quantum states or even to all quantum Bayesians the particular
philosophical positions advanced in QBism: The perimeter of quantum Bayesian-
ism. Timpson, for example, advances a reconstruction of quantum Bayesianism
that is far more conservative than the sort of position I take it he (Fuchs) would
most prefer (Timpson 2008, p. 595). Bub proposes that a quantum theory is
fundamentally a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of information
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transfer in our world ... not a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves
or particles (Bub 2004, p. 20), but counsels agnosticism in place of metaphysi-
cal or ontological speculation as a result. However, Fuchs' arguments for QBism
are compelling and the position sketched is nothing if not radical; it is therefore
worth examining as philosophy, and searching out the physical, metaphysical and
ontological assumptions underlying it.
Fuchs begins QBism: The perimeter of quantum Bayesianism with a metaphor:
like an annual bout of the ﬂu, the foundational problems of quantum mechan-
ics are a common annoyance that many physicists fear may one day turn out
to be a symptom of something fatal (p. 1; see also Fuchs 2002). Fortunately,
QBism provides a vaccine: To take this substance into one's mindset is all the
vaccination one needs against the threat that quantum theory contains something
viral for theoretical physics as a whole (p. 9). The present paper closely exam-
ines the ingredients of Fuchs' vaccine, and shows that it in fact functions only
as an analgesic, one with strange but revealing side eﬀects. QBism suﬀers its
own versions of the standard foundational diﬃculties, versions from which new
insights for quantum theory as a whole may be obtained. As will be shown, these
QBist versions of the standard foundational diﬃculties enter the theory through
its two realist assumptions: the assumption that interactions with the world cause
experiences and hence the revision of beliefs, and the assumption that physical
systems have objective dimensions. A close comparison with quantum Dar-
winism and the environment as witness formulation of decoherence theory on
which it rests (Zurek, 1998; Zurek, 2003; Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek, 2004; Ollivier/
Poulin/Zurek, 2005; Blume-Kohout/Zurek, 2006; Zurek, 2007; Zurek, 2009) is
used throughout to illustrate both the novelty and the familiarity of QBism's
underlying assumptions, and to show by example how the more problematic con-
sequences of these assumptions can arise within interpretative approaches very
diﬀerent from QBism.
The ingredients of the QBist vaccine are assessed in three stages. The ﬁrst exam-
ines the metaphysics implicit in Fuchs' characterization of measurement interac-
tions between an observer and an external quantum system. Two consequences
of this metaphysics that Fuchs closely approaches but leaves unstated are made
explicit: that the QBist world has no objective dynamics, and that all physical
systems are, for Fuchs, autonomous agents. Hence the QBist view is autonomy
all the way down, a metaphysical stance that makes the horror of non-locality
perhaps a bit less horrible by comparison. The second stage critically examines
the ontology that Fuchs oﬀers in place of ψ-ontology  i.e. in place of an ontology
of quantum systems that exist in objective quantum states and evolve according
to a well-deﬁned objective dynamics. QBism proposes instead an ontology of this
and this and this ... every particular that is and every way of carving up every
particular that is (p. 22) in which the real world ... is taken for granted (p. 7). It
is shown that this common-sense ontology fails to make contact with the implicit
ontology of Fuchs' formalism, an ontology of quantum systems characterized by
well-deﬁned ﬁnite values of d, a quantity that Fuchs takes to be observer indepen-
dent and hence to characterize a quantum system as a matter of objective fact:
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Dimension is something a body holds all by itself, regardless of what an agent
thinks of it (p. 23). This ontological disconnect raises the question of what Fuchs
means by positing quantum systems as `real existences' external to the agent (p.
15), and suggests that Fuchs' positing of systems may not be common-sensical
at all, but rather a fundamental and conceptually problematic axiom as it is
in quantum Darwinism. It is then shown that, while Fuchs dismisses decoher-
ence theory and the general project of explaining the emergence of classicality
(Zurek, 1998; Zurek, 2003; Joos et al., 2003; Schlosshauer, 2004; Schlosshauer,
2007) as unnecessary (and actually obstructive) (p. 24; parentheses in original),
QBist and quantum Darwinist observers face a common problem of identifying
the quantum systems with which they are interacting, and to which, eo ipso,
the terms of their quantum-mechanical formalism refer. Under both approaches
they are forced into a common solution  basically Bohr's solution  of assum-
ing that quantum systems can be identiﬁed by their classical properties (Bohr,
1928). This solution distorts the quantum formalism by forcing terms referring
to quantum systems to function both as logically proper names and as deﬁnite
descriptions, rendering their semantics incoherent and suggesting that diachronic
term reference poses a deeper problem for quantum foundations that is generally
recognized.
The third and ﬁnal stage examines the role played by observers in QBism. QBist
observers employ quantum mechanics as a users' manual (p 8) to cope with the
uncertainty of the world, but by being autonomous, appear also to be the source
of this uncertainty. One might expect, therefore, for QBism to view the observer
as a primary object of theoretical investigation. Fuchs lampoons this suggestion:
would one ever imagine that the notion of an agent, the user of the theory, could
be derived out of its conceptual apparatus? (p. 8). QBism nonetheless provides
an implicit theory of the observer as an entity that is both an autonomous
agent that uses quantum mechanics to update beliefs and an observable real-
world quantum system with ﬁxed d. As will be shown, all quantum systems can
be regarded as observers in QBism; hence the measurement environment itself
can be regarded as an observer as it is in decoherence theory. Characterizing
the environment as an observer yields a QBist analog of the environment as
witness, a super-observer that continuously monitors and updates its beliefs
about all other systems. It is shown that including the environment as a witness
in the description of measurement places an intolerable strain on the QBist ontol-
ogy, one that can be resolved only by merging the observed external system and
the surrounding environment into a single entity to which the observer's beliefs
refer. The paper concludes by suggesting that this ontological predicament is
not a speciﬁc side-eﬀect of QBism, but rather a general consequence of quantum
theory itself, one that appears to be resolvable only by rejecting the assumption
of objectively separable systems to which the terms of the theory diachronically
refer.
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2 QBist metaphysics
As noted, quantum information for the QBist is about the consequences (for me)
of my actions upon the physical system. The individual-speciﬁc Bayesian view of
probability adds the for me to the traditional instrumentalist and nomological-
deductivist position that predictive power is all that can be expected of science,
producing a view in which even probabilistic predictions are purely personal:
QBism ﬁnds its happiest spot in an unﬂinching combination of `subjective prob-
ability' with `objective indeterminism'  (p. 8, fn. 14). Such positions have always
been resisted from more realist, or possibly just more curious quarters with a de-
mand to know what caused the consequences and how it caused them. Fuchs'
ﬁerce rejection of solipsism (p. 6, Fig. 1 and p. 19, Fig. 5) is borne out by his
willingness to address these questions: Fuchs is a personalist about information,
but not a personalist (i.e. not a solipsist) about metaphysics or ontology. Unlike
a solipsist, Fuchs insists that science is possible, even if is an intensely personal
science; unlike a traditional instrumentalist, Fuchs also insists that science pro-
vides explanations, even though they cannot be reductive. This section focuses
on Fuchs' account of how? the consequences with which QBist agents must
cope come about; the what? question is considered in the next section.
Fuchs is very clear on how consequences do not come about: they do not come
about by the linear evolution of the state vectors of quantum systems: QUAN-
TUM STATES DO NOT EXIST and hence cannot evolve linearly or otherwise.
How consequences do come about is explained mainly by an illustration (p. 6, Fig.
1) showing an observer  described as an agent  interacting with a quantum
system. The agent interacts with the system via a measurement device, which
is depicted as a prosthetic hand to make it clear that (it) should be considered
an integral part of the agent (p. 6, Fig. 1 caption). The interaction is purely
local: the measurement device makes contact with the system being measured.
Interaction requires two steps. First, the agent acts on the system; this action is
represented formally by a POVM, a generalized observable consisting of a set of
operators {Ei}. Second, the agent experiences a consequence, which is one of
the operators Ek: the consequence = an experience, Ek (Fig. 1). The selection
of Ek from among the {Ei} is the reaction of the quantum system to the agent's
action {Ei}. This action and reaction constitute the measurement: For a Quan-
tum Bayesian, the only physical process in a quantum measurement is what was
previously seen as `the selection step'  i.e. the agent's action on the external
world and its unpredictable consequence for her (Fuchs/Schack 2011a, p. 12).
The quantum state |ψ〉 describing the system makes no appearance but in the
agent's head; for it captures his degrees of belief concerning the consequences of
his actions (p. 6, Fig. 1 caption).
Four aspects of this depiction of measurement interactions are worth noting.
First, what is depicted in Fig. 1 at least appears to be a physical interaction.
Fuchs describes it as such in the passage quoted above: the only physical process
in a quantum measurement is what was previously seen as `the selection step '
(italics added). If the measurement apparatus is an integral part of the agent
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and the measurement interaction is a physical processes, then the Bayesian up-
dating of the agent's belief as a result of the measurement  the action of the
selected Ek on the belief |ψ〉 to produce a particular observationally-revised belief
Ek(|ψ〉)  must itself be a physical event. This rules out one commonplace view,
that there is no relevant change in anything physical when he does so (i.e. when
an agent updates a belief); the only changes are internal to the agent ascribing
the state (Timpson 2008, p. 585, emphasis in original). If the internal changes
that implement belief updating are physical changes implemented by the selected
POVM component Ek, as they must be if information is regarded as physically
encoded (Landauer, 1999), the argument that QBism dispenses with collapse
simply by regarding quantum states subjectively becomes problematic. The con-
cern of Palge/Konrad (2008) that Fuchs' formalism requires an inﬁnite collection
of readjustment operators arranged in a look-up table to compensate for the
initial state of the apparatus is also elevated from a mathematical worry to a
serious implementation issue.
Second, while the events composing the measurement interaction are tradition-
ally viewed from the perspective of the agent, they can also be viewed from the
perspective of the system being measured. Viewing the agent as a physical sys-
tem and using for a moment the traditional language of objective quantum states
to describe the agent's states of belief, the agent is initially in |ψ〉, and is then
acted upon by the system in a way that results in the agent being in Ek(|ψ〉).
Viewed formally, this selection by an external quantum system of a particular
state Ek(|ψ〉) of an agent who interacts with that system is a process familiar
from decoherence theory: einselection, the selection by the environment of a par-
ticular quantum state of any system interacting with that environment (Zurek,
1998; Zurek, 2003). Since this change of perspective on the situation employs the
idea of a quantum state as an objective physical state (|ψ〉) of a physical system
(the agent), it is completely opposed to the QBist view, but it illustrates the
formal relationship between QBism and decoherence that Fuchs derives by other
means (Fuchs/Schack, 2011a).
The third aspect worth noting follows from the second: given that in QBism |ψ〉
is not an objective quantum state of the agent  quantum states do not exist
 what kind of state is it? What does Fuchs mean by saying that |ψ〉 represents
degrees of belief that are in the agent's head and how does the experience
Ek act on these degrees of belief? Quantum Bayesians, like ordinary Bayesians,
cash out degrees of belief in terms of an agent's overt behavior : choices made,
decisions taken, bets placed and the like. Behaviors are physical events, as are
the sensory processes  photons impacting retinal cells, for example  that are re-
quired in order for measurement outcomes to be experienced. That such physical
events cause and are caused by transitions between degrees of belief suggests
strongly that such transitions and hence degrees of belief themselves have some
physical implementation within the physical systems constituting observers. If
they are not implemented by objective quantum states, how are they imple-
mented? This is clearly a question that Fuchs does not want to answer, as it calls
for a theory of the agent of precisely the kind that Fuchs rejects. The need for
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such a theory becomes clear, however, as soon as one imagines an observer that
is not a common-sense cognitive agent. Fuchs quotes with approval John Bell's
lampoon of the idea that measurements are the distinct prerogative of human
beings or even living systems (p. 1), and later proposes that the observer  sys-
tem relationship holds for every two parts of the world (p. 27), in which case
every physical interaction counts as measurement, just as it does in decoher-
ence theory. In place of the ordinary physical interaction between A and B by
which ubiquitous measurement is implemented in decoherence theory, however,
QBism substitutes the action by A on B with a POVM and the selection by
B, in reaction, of a particular POVM component as A's experience. Hence all
physical systems, even elementary particles, must be capable of experience, and
interpretable as having degrees of belief that these experiences update. Does
this mean even `elementary' physical events just after the big bang must make
use of concepts that, to the reductionist mind, must be 15 billion years removed
down the evolutionary chain? You bet it does (p. 21, fn. 37; emphasis in orig-
inal). Fuchs hints that the causal eﬀects of such concepts and of degrees of
belief in general may be example(s) of an interaction between two nonreduc-
tionist realms in which Each realm inﬂuences the other as its turn comes (p.
21, fn. 37) as in classic Cartesian dualist interactionism. If interactions between
physical systems are to be regarded as physical interactions and accounted for by
physical theory, however, concepts, degrees of belief, POVM components and
experiences must all have physical implementations.
The fourth aspect of Fuchs' depiction of measurement that is worth noting is that
measurement, for the QBist, does not involve quantum information exchange. In
QBism, quantum information is personal information for me that is inaccessi-
ble to other agents, as Fuchs makes clear in his extended analysis of Wigner's
friend (pp. 67; see also below). This distinguishes QBism from alternative,
non-personalist instrumentalist approaches such as Bub (2004) as well as more
traditional approaches in which (objective) classical information is (objective)
quantum information that has survived decoherence (Zurek, 2003; Schlosshauer,
2007; Griﬃths, 2007). Hence while Fuchs comments brieﬂy on the reasonableness
of viewing quantum teleportation in the usual way, i.e. saying that it transfers
quantum information from Alice's site to Bob's (p. 3; emphasis in original), this
view is not consistent with QBism. If quantum information is non-sharable per-
sonal information, Bob may acquire it by acting on a quantum system with a
POVM, but it cannot be transferred from one agent to another. In the case of
quantum teleportation, the quantum system on which Bob acts with a POVM,
and which selects an experienced POVM component in return, is the system
that implements what would ordinarily be called the communication channel from
Alice, but since quantum information cannot be communicated, this system does
not function as a channel in the scenario. Bob's interaction is therefore a local
interaction with the channel, not a distant, channel-mediated interaction with
Alice. How Bob's interaction with the channel selects a POVM component that
acts on his prior beliefs about Alice  or even his prior beliefs about the channel
 is not described by QBism; POVMs are usually deﬁned as acting on quantum
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states (e.g. Nielsen/Chaung 2000, Ch. 2), and quantum states do not exist. How-
ever, by making quantum information personal and thereby ruling out quantum
information exchange between systems, Fuchs appears to rule out any physi-
cal selection mechanism, as any such mechanism could be described in terms of
quantum information exchange, as indeed they are described in more traditional
approaches to measurement. Hence as with the question of how experiences
are implemented physically discussed above, how selection of an experience is
implemented remains to be explained within QBism.
In the absence of a well-deﬁned physical mechanism for POVM component selec-
tion, Fuchs lapses into language that appears, at least, to be entirely metaphori-
cal: quantum measurements are moments of creation (p. 14; emphasis in origi-
nal); their consequences are unique creation(s) (p. 6, Fig. 1 caption) to which
quantum systems give birth (p. 27). Consistent with this view of measure-
ment interactions as involving creation and birth, all quantum systems are
characterized as agents that, within the constraints of their ﬁnite values of d,
are autonomous : the universe ... should be thought of as a thriving commu-
nity of marriageable, but otherwise autonomous entities (p. 14). This sense of
autonomy is stronger than the intrinsic stochasticity of e.g. Mermin (1998) or
Griﬃths (2011): autonomy here indicates objective, in-principle indeterminism
with a corresponding in-principle absence of external control. As Timpson puts
it, the really crucial conception is that what (singular) event will occur when a
system and a measuring device interact is not determined by anything, not even
probabilistically (Timpson 2008, p. 596). Fuchs' sense of objective indetermin-
ism goes beyond even that of Cartwright (1999): where things diﬀer in our case
(i.e. QBism) is that we are imagining that at the fundamental level there are
no situations, however specialized, in which we will obtain lawlike behaviour
(Timpson 2008, p. 597). Fuchs uses the term interiority (p. 20) to emphasize
the inaccessibility of an individual-speciﬁc quantum state (i.e. a belief) to in-
spection by external agents or manipulation, even probabilistically, by external
forces. Such autonomy is the very antithesis of the deterministic, unitary time
evolution described by the Schrödinger equation, and applied to the universe as a
whole by Everett (1957) and all advocates of minimal quantum mechanics since
(e.g. Tegmark 2010; Schlosshauer 2006; for broader discussion see Schlosshauer
2007; Landsman 2007; Wallace 2008).
Universal autonomy, applying to all systems at all scales, would imply that no
dynamics are well deﬁned either within or between speciﬁed systems. Fuchs is
committed to the autonomy of human observers, quoting with approval a state-
ment by Hans Primus that such autonomy is a prerequisite of science (p. 18).
Given this commitment for human observers, the Conway-Kochen free will the-
orem requires it to be extended to quantum systems in general (Conway/Kochen,
2006; Conway/Kochen, 2009). Fuchs frames universal autonomy formally as a
rejection of the EPR criterion of reality that a probability-one prediction by a
correct dynamical theory requires that an event be observed if anyone bothers
to look for it (p. 18, esp. fn. 29), but his gloss on this result strips away any
doubt that it is just an epistemological claim: At the instigation of a quantum
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measurement, something new comes into the world that was not there before;
and that is about as clear an instance of creation as one can imagine. Sometimes
one will have no strong beliefs for what will result from the creation ... and some-
times one will have very strong beliefs ... but a free creation of nature it remains
(p. 19; emphasis in original). How such free creations relate to the apparently
physical processes illustrated in Fig. 1 or to the action on the initial belief |ψ〉 by
the selected POVM component Ek to produce a revised belief Ek(|ψ〉) is never
discussed.
With free creation replacing well-deﬁned dynamics, there can be no idea of
well-deﬁned physical mechanisms by which either the system or the observer
evolve that can be discovered by empirical investigation. Physical laws can
be discovered, but these are normative statements that guide decision making,
not descriptions of objective facts. The Born rule, for example, is normative ...
like the Biblical Ten Commandments; it guides, `Gamble in such a way that
all your probabilities mesh through me'  and agents are free to ignore the ad-
vice if they choose to (p. 8, Figure 2 caption). Hence the fundamental questions
raised by Fuchs' illustration of measurement, how does the agent's action with the
POVM aﬀect the system, and how does the system select a particular POVM
component as the agent's experience, not only are not but cannot be answered
within QBism. Fuchs redeﬁnes the goals of physics away from answering such
questions, ﬁrst by rejecting any search for the building blocks of the world:
Physics ... is not about identifying the bricks with which nature is made, but
about identifying what is common to the largest range of phenomena it can get
its hands on (p. 22; emphasis in original). Newton's law of universal gravitation
is advanced as an example of such a non-reductionist commonality (though how
Newton's quite deterministic law would fare in a universe of autonomous gravita-
tional agents is not discussed). Many would regard descriptions of underlying
physical mechanisms  gauge boson exchange, for example  as exemplary physi-
cal commonalities, but mechanisms by deﬁnition require not just building blocks,
but also the notions that buildings blocks have both individual and collective
states, and that these states evolve in well-deﬁned ways. Fuchs rejects all of
these. He congratulates Bohr for refusing to give a mechanistic explanation for
atomic spectra (p. 25), alluding (one assumes) to Bohr's admission that there
obviously can be no question of a mechanical foundation for his quantized model
of electron orbitals (Bohr 1913, p. 15). By refusing himself to provide any mecha-
nistic account of the selection of POVM components by physical systems or of the
updating of beliefs (i.e. quantum states) by observers, Fuchs at least appears to
place measurement, and hence physical interactions in general, outside the realm
of physical investigation.
In the place of common building blocks or physical mechanisms, Fuchs proposes
the dimension d as the commonality, the previously unnoticed capacity inherent
in all matter (p. 23) that quantum mechanics has discovered, and that quantum
theory is about. QBism makes the bold claim that the dimension d of any quan-
tum system is by deﬁnition ﬁnite; that the inﬁnite dimensional Hilbert spaces
commonly attributed to quantum systems are just a useful artiﬁce when a prob-
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lem can be economically handled with a diﬀerential equation (p. 25). Dimension
appears, for Fuchs, to measure the ability of a quantum system to behave au-
tonomously, to create. He characterizes d as a measure of the fuel upon which
quantum computation runs, the raw irritability of a quantum system to be-
ing eavesdropped upon (both p. 23), oompf (p. 25) or zing (Fuchs 2002, p.
9). Though Fuchs points enthusiastically toward the future, the kinds of physics
one can do with autonomous agents characterized by ﬁxed, ﬁnite values of d
remain unclear. Approaching this question requires understanding what these
autonomous agents are, i.e. understanding just what after all is the world made
of  (p. 9; emphasis in original) for a QBist.
3 QBist ontology
As mentioned above, Fuchs assumes an ontology in which the real world ... is
taken for granted and adds to this common sense ontology the notion of a
quantum system with a well-deﬁned, observer-independent dimension d. Under-
standing what causes the consequences that QBist observers observe requires
understanding how being an ordinary object, a this and this and this relates to
being a quantum system with ﬁxed d. This section shows both that this relation-
ship is not as straightforward as Fuchs appears to think, and that QBism shares
this fundamental ontological non-straightforwardness with quantum Darwinism
(Zurek, 1998; Zurek, 2003; Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek, 2004; Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek,
2005; Blume-Kohout/Zurek, 2006; Zurek, 2007; Zurek, 2009), perhaps the most
distant from QBism of all major approaches to quantum foundations. The funda-
mental issue underlying this non-straightforwardness lies deep in the formalism of
quantum mechanics: it is the question of what is implied operationally by the as-
signment of a name  e.g. S or Alice  to a quantum system. This section makes
precise the ontological problem of specifying the referent of a formal expression
that names a quantum system as it arises in QBism, and compares the QBist ver-
sion of this reference problem to the version that arises in quantum Darwinism.
It shows that QBism cannot have both system names that refer diachronically
in a common sense way and ﬁxed values for system dimension, and raises the
question of how QBism is to cope with the common scientiﬁc practice of deﬁning
systems ad hoc. The next section explores these issues from the perspective of a
QBist observer, and shows that they can be resolved only by viewing every QBist
observer as interacting with exactly one system: the entire rest of that observer's
universe.
What exactly is being assumed by QBism when the real world ... is taken
for granted? Fuchs is clearly serious on this point; he stresses that quantum
mechanics is a tool for making practical choices in the real world characterized
by real uncertainty: In my case, it is a world in which I am forced to be uncertain
about the consequences of most of my actions; and in your case, it is a world in
which you are forced to be uncertain about the consequences of most of your
actions (p. 8; see also p. 20, fn. 33). Following Einstein and many others, Fuchs
explicitly takes for granted both separability and local causation: what is it
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that A and B are spatially distant things but that they are causally independent?
(p. 15). Consistent with the idea that quantum states have a particular space-
time location  in the head of the agent whose beliefs they characterize (p. 5) 
EPR pairs and entanglement in general do not objectively exist in QBism; indeed,
preserving Einsteinian intuitions of locality and separability are two of the major
motivations behind QBism (Fuchs, 2002). If an agent assumes two quantum
systems are separable, they are: If the left-hand system can manipulate the
right-hand system, even when by assumption it cannot, then who is to say that the
right-hand system cannot manipulate the agent himself? It would be a wackier
world than even the one QBism entertains (p. 18; emphasis in original). Hence
correct dynamical theories cannot require external systems to be in particular
states, as the EPR criterion of reality would suggest, but assumptions by agents
can require that systems be separable, ruling out entanglement as a real, agent-
independent phenomenon. The assumptions of separability and locality across
the board mean that for Fuchs, not just apparatus (as Bohr 1928 insisted) but
all systems can be considered to be ordinary classical objects; what quantum
mechanics captures is any observer's in-principle uncertainty about what any one
of these objects, being an autonomous (quantum) agent, will do next. Hence what
is taken for granted by QBists is what the objects making up the real world
are; what these objects might do is, for the QBist, fundamentally uncertain.
Fuchs uses the classic paradox of Wigner's friend to illustrate the subjective
nature of beliefs about, and hence quantum state assignments to, ordinary real
world objects. He introduces the paradox in the usual way: It starts oﬀ with
the friend and Wigner having a conversation: Suppose they both agree that some
quantum state |ψ〉 captures their mutual beliefs about the quantum system (p.
6), and goes on to discuss how Wigner's and his friend's individual quantum
state assignments (i.e. beliefs) diverge after the friend performs a measurement
unobserved by Wigner. What is interesting here, and what remains undiscussed
by Fuchs (or other commentators on Wigner's friend, e.g. Schlosshauer 2007, pp.
364365 or Timpson 2008, pp. 584585 and 593), is that (1) Wigner and his friend
are able to identify a single quantum system as a mutual system of interest
to which their beliefs refer, (2) that the friend is able, after the conversation
with Wigner, to carry out a measurement on that very same quantum system
(a perdurantist would say, part of the very same system), and (3) that after the
friend's measurement, the friend and Wigner can potentially disagree about  i.e
have diﬀerent beliefs that refer to  the same system that they previously mutually
identiﬁed. How does this work: how do Wigner and his friend both identify the
system of interest, and how do they re-identify it (or if they are perdurantists,
its later temporal parts) later? It appears that, as with separability, if Wigner
and his friend assume that they are referring to the same system, then they are
referring to the same system; similarly if they assume they have re-identiﬁed the
same system, then they have re-identiﬁed it, as a matter of objective, physical
fact. These assumptions are made very clear in the formalism: Wigner treats
his friend as a second quantum system to which he assigns a quantum state (i.e.
a belief) ρ, he assumes a unitary time evolution U for the combined friend ⊗
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system, and computes an expected joint state U(ρ ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U † (p. 7, Fuchs'
notation). This formal representation explicitly assumes that U(ρ ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U †
refers to friend ⊗ system, i.e. that U , being a unitary operator deﬁned on the
Hilbert space of friend ⊗ system, does nothing that would alter the identity
over time of friend ⊗ system or its Hilbert space. It also implicitly assumes
that whoever calculated it is still able to identify U(ρ ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U † as a state of
friend⊗system, i.e. that it is clear to observers that the time evolution has done
nothing to alter the identity of friend ⊗ system. These formal representations
would clearly be incorrect if Wigner was mistaken about which system his friend
had identiﬁed and measured, or if he was mistaken in his re-identiﬁcation of his
friend.
Before considering the question of how observers determine that a system seen
now is the same thing as a system seen earlier within QBism, let us examine
this question from the more traditional perspective of ψ-ontology and objective
quantum states. Within this framework, a Hilbert space for a system S is speciﬁed
by specifying a set of basis vectors {|si〉}; the dimension of the Hilbert space is
the number of these basis vectors. Each basis vector is taken to represent a
physical degree of freedom that the system has as a matter of objective fact. If
the system has many parts that can move or otherwise behave independently, then
the individual ways that these parts can move or otherwise behave are counted
among the degrees of freedom. The state of the system is then represented as a
function of these degrees of freedom by an expression such as |S〉 = ∑i λi|si〉;
this state is an objective characteristic of the system observable, as Pauli says,
by objective registering apparatus, the results of which are objectively available
for anyone's inspection (p. 7, quotation by Fuchs). This expression formally
speciﬁes the identity of S; to point and say this is S is just to say that this has
the speciﬁed physical degrees of freedom and no others, and that its objectively
existing state has the form
∑
i λi|si〉 for some set of complex numbers λi.
In practice, in the laboratory, no one examines systems such as particle detectors
or laptop computers to determine what physical degrees of freedom they have,
and no one checks that the laptop computer, for example, on their desk today
has exactly the same set of physical degrees of freedom that the laptop computer
on their desk yesterday had. The identity over time of these systems is assumed,
just as Wigner assumes that the person that he sees when he walks back into
the laboratory is indeed his friend. Formally, this is an assumption that the
propagation of the system over time is unitary; in practice, it is the assumption
that the parts composing the system and the physical degrees of freedom of
those parts have not changed. Evidence that either the parts or their physical
degrees of freedom have changed can lead questions about the system's identity
and demands for an explanation. However, obtaining such evidence requires ﬁrst
identifying the system, at least tentatively: to determine that the laptop on your
desk is not the same one that was there yesterday, one ﬁrst has to identify it
as something, i.e. as not part of the general background of the world, and then
identify it as a laptop. Employing a measurement device to obtain information
about some distant, microscopic, or otherwise not directly observable system
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similarly requires ﬁrst identifying the measurement device: a pointer value of 5,
for example, means nothing on its own. Traditional accounts of measurement do
not explicitly address this issue of system identiﬁcation; they assume that systems
are speciﬁed by specifying a list of objective degrees of freedom, and go on from
there.
Fuchs carefully avoids any discussion of physical degrees of freedom through-
out QBism: The perimeter of quantum Bayesianism; indeed his discussion of
non-reductionist goals for physics suggests that he views investigations of the
parts of things and how they might move or otherwise behave to be outside the
proper purview of experimental science. Hilbert spaces are not objective collec-
tions of physical degrees of freedom in QBism, but rather calculation tools; it
is only dimension that is objective. Hence in QBism, physical systems can-
not be identiﬁed by examining their parts or the physical degrees of freedom of
such parts. One cannot check that |S〉 = ∑i λi|si〉 as a matter of fact, because
|S〉 =∑i λi|si〉 is not a matter of fact, it is only a subjective, personal belief. The
real world, however, is nonetheless real, and friends, laptops and laboratory
apparatus have to be identiﬁed. Within QBism, all of these things are systems,
and systems are autonomous agents that are probed with POVMs and respond
by selecting POVM components. Hence system identiﬁcation can only be accom-
plished, within QBism, by probing systems with POVMs. Because POVMs are
formally deﬁned over particular Hilbert spaces, each particular system within the
real world must have a particular POVM that identiﬁes it and only it. The
assumption that the real world ... is taken for granted must, therefore, be sup-
plemented by an additional assumption: that observers have at their disposal
POVMs capable of speciﬁcally identifying the systems that populate the world
(Fields, 2012).
How this supplementary assumption works in practice can been examined in the
case of Wigner's friend. In order to identify the system of interest and his friend,
Wigner must be equipped with POVMs  call them {Si} and {Fi} respectively
 speciﬁc to each of them. Suppose that when Wigner acts on the system and
his friend with these identifying POVMs at t, they select the POVM components
Sk and Fk in reaction. At some later time t+ ∆t, Wigner employs these POVMs
again, and the same POVM components are again selected in reaction. To infer
that the systems probed at t + ∆t were the same systems that were probed
at t, Wigner must assume that the POVMs {Si} and {Fi} yield unambiguous
identiﬁcations, i.e. that the components Sk and Fk can only be selected by the
system of interest and his friend, respectively. This assumption can clearly take
two forms: it can be assumed either that {Si} and {Fi} are in fact speciﬁc to
the system and the friend, respectively, or that these POVMs are deﬁned over
a larger Hilbert space that encompasses these objects plus others, but that they
nonetheless yield the components Sk and Fk only when acting on the system and
the friend, respectively. As Hilbert spaces are not objective in QBism, there is no
physical diﬀerence between these two assumptions. For simplicity, therefore, it
can be assumed that {Si} and {Fi} are individual-speciﬁc detectors with only two
signiﬁcant components: Sk = S1 = 1 is selected always and only by the system of
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interest (similarly Fk = F1 = 1 by his friend) and S0 = 0 is selected always and
only by systems other than the system of interest (similarly F0 = 0 by systems
other than his friend). These POVMs then behave semantically as diachronic
rigid designators, i.e. logically proper names. They must commute with each
other and with all other observables (at least all other observables applicable to
the system or the friend), i.e. they must behave as classical diachronic rigid
designators. This requirement is independent of what kind of system is being
referred to; it applies equally to hunks of matter and to higher-order entities
identiﬁed by structural or functional criteria (e.g. Wallace (2005)). Because
QBism has no concept of an objective quantum state and hence no concept of
a projection deﬁned as a physical process acting on objective quantum states, it
has no natural way of imposing an objective coarse-graining that would permit a
many-to-one mapping from quantum systems to observations other than equality
of selected POVM components. Hence QBism has no concept of a framework
within which multiple systems might yield indistinguishable observations (e.g. as
in the consistent histories approach, Griﬃths 2011) other than that provided by
POVM component selection.
It is not only Wigner who must assume that Wigner has available POVMs that
identify individual quantum systems diachronically; to develop his critique of
ψ-ontology Fuchs must assume this, too. For if either or both of Wigner's di-
achronic identiﬁcations are wrong, his computed belief U(ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U † is, from
his perspective, no longer about friend⊗system, but about whatever Wigner has
mistakenly identiﬁed as friend⊗ system. In this case, the paradox of Wigner's
friend collapses; nothing of interest follows from Wigner and his friend having in-
consistent beliefs that refer, in fact, to diﬀerent external systems. The possibility
of conﬂicting beliefs about a single quantum system tells against the objectivity
of quantum states only if the conﬂicting beliefs are assumed to refer to the correct
systems. QBism thus not only requires that the systems composing the world can
be taken for granted and that POVMs that speciﬁcally identify these systems
exist; it also requires that observers employ these system-identifying POVMs
correctly  it requires that the ability of observers to name things consistently
over time be taken for granted. This assumption that system identiﬁcation and
hence term reference works in a straightforward way is an unnoticed but natural
correlate of the assumptions of separability and locality.
The ﬁrst thing to note about the diachronic system-identifying POVMs tacitly
assumed by QBism is that they are required not just formally but operationally:
they must be implemented by the local observer  system interactions of the
kind illustrated in Fuchs' Fig. 1. The constitutions of Wigner and his friend,
for example, must be such that when Wigner executes the action {F0, F1} on his
friend, his friend selects F1 as Wigner's experience in reaction; otherwise Wigner
cannot identify his friend. The strength of this requirement becomes clear when
one consider the usual channel-mediated Alice  Bob interaction, e.g. quantum
teleportation. In this case, Bob's local action with an Alice-identifying POVM
{A0, A1} on the channel must physically select A1 as Bob's experience in reac-
tion if Bob is to identify the channel as the channel from Alice. As noted above,
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QBism oﬀers no account of how this implementation of POVM component se-
lection works. Any physical implementation, however, introduces the physical
possibility of error; if an action by Wigner on some other system X with {F0, F1}
happens to result in a selection of F1, Wigner will mistakenly identify X as his
friend, a situation not unknown in real life (e.g. Sacks (1985)). Hence if it is to
admit any physical interpretation, the most that QBism can actually assume is
that system-identifying POVMs implement diachronic designators that are ap-
proximately rigid, that agents using such identiﬁers get system identiﬁcation right
most of the time, and hence that Wigner's friend scenarios remain paradoxical
for realist interpretations of quantum states most of the time.
The second thing to note is that interactions with the operational characteristics
of {F0, F1} are also tacitly assumed by other interpretative approaches to quan-
tum mechanics, including in particular quantum Darwinism. In the environment
as witness framework, the locus of this assumption is the operational deﬁnition
of objectivity:
A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to ﬁnd out what it is without prior knowledge
about the system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agree-
ment."
(p. 1 of Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek 2004; p. 3 of Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek
2005)
This deﬁnition, like Fuchs' recounting of Wigner's friend, assumes that the ob-
servers in question can arrive at a consensus that they are observing the same
system and maintain that consensus through the process of determining the sys-
tem's properties. Hence it requires that the observers have an operational method
of identifying the system at the start of their investigations and re-identifying it
at the end. This operational re-identiﬁcation method must commute with all
other observables, and hence must be eﬀectively classical (Fields, 2010; Fields,
2011) just as it does in QBism. Quantum Darwinism is realist about quantum
states and realist about decoherence, while QBism is instrumentalist about both;
the common assumption of diachronic (approximately) rigid designators by both
approaches shows that this assumption is independent of whether one is a realist
or an instrumentalist about quantum states.
The third thing to note about QBism's requirement for individual-speciﬁc di-
achronic identiﬁers is that it conﬂicts with QBism's basic postulate that each
quantum system has a well-deﬁned, ﬁnite, observer-independent dimension d. As
noted above, Fuchs introduces d as the Hilbert-space dimension of a system (p.
12; see also pp. 19 ﬀ. and Fuchs 2002 p. 51) and explicitly argues that d as a
Hilbert space dimension is always ﬁnite (p. 25), but throughout refers to d sim-
ply as dimension to emphasize that Hilbert spaces are not objective entities
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in QBism but only tools for performing calculations. The capacity of a system
for autonomous behavior that d measures is, however, an objective fact about
the world; it is the previously unnoticed capacity inherent in all matter that
Fuchs claims quantum mechanics has discovered (p. 23). The conﬂict between
the need for individual-speciﬁc diachronic identiﬁers and ﬁxed, objective values
of d appears as soon as one applies both requirements to a quantum system that
continues as a real existence through time. Suppose that X is such a system,
and that an agent A has a POVM {X0, X1} that uniquely and accurately identi-
ﬁes X at least most of the time. Because d objectively measures the capacity for
autonomy and the dimension dX of X is ﬁxed, any beliefs that A may have, how-
ever they have been obtained, that include attributions of more or less capacity
for autonomy to X at diﬀerent times are false. This is clearly paradoxical if the
individual-speciﬁc diachronic identiﬁers required by the theory function at all like
proper names in a natural language, i.e. if they continue to refer despite signiﬁ-
cant structural and featural changes to their referents. Consider, for example, A's
beliefs concerning her children: the capacity of children for autonomous behavior
increases with time on any plausible reading of autonomous, yet proper names
in natural languages continue to refer to them despite their increasing d, or in the
traditional, non-QBist view, the increasing numbers of objective physical degrees
of freedom in their objective Hilbert spaces. While non-QBist quantum mechanics
can fall back on a deﬁnition of system identity based on the presence or absence
of physical degrees of freedom, however, QBism does not have this option; QBism
can only deﬁne diachronic system identity using individual-speciﬁc POVMs. If
these POVMs do not continue to refer despite signiﬁcant featural changes to their
referents, which they will not if the systems to which they refer do not have ﬁxed
d, it is not clear how they can support the communication or consensus needed to
support the diachronic identiﬁcation of a system X by multiple agents who have
mutually observationally inaccessible experiences X1 or X0. Without this ability,
however, system-identifying POVMs cannot do their job: they cannot identify
systems as real existences in the real world.
Signiﬁcant changes in the properties of systems named by natural-language iden-
tiﬁers are often handled, in practice, by everyone knows conventions about the
operational signiﬁcance of the changes: everyone knows that the behavioral
capacities of the LHC have changed over the lifetime of the term LHC and
everyone knows that they must take these changes into account when acting on
beliefs about the LHC. This work-around hides the problem of diachronic refer-
ence, however, rather than solving it. If d is ﬁxed, the behavioral capacities of
systems never change; what is called behavioral change in ordinary language
 for example, the change from not being able to accelerate protons to several
TeV to being able to so accelerate them  is the replacement of a system X with
dimension d by a diﬀerent system X ′ with dimension d′. In a QBist context,
the problem of diachronic reference is solved only if all agents concerned with a
given system X update their system-identifying POVMs whenever X is replaced
in fact by X ′. Even setting aside the question of how agents are to discover that
X has been replaced by X ′, how they update their system-identifying POVMs
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remains a mystery: an agent can attempt to act on any system at all with a
POVM {X ′0, X ′1}, but that POVM does not identify X ′ unless X ′ reacts back on
the agent to select X ′1. Hence it would appear that updating an identiﬁer, in
QBism, requires a physical operation on X ′, a system that the agent attempting
to perform the update cannot, by assumption, identify.
The problem of diachronic reference can be solved, within QBism, only by ad-
mitting that agents routinely get it wrong, or by dropping the requirement that
systems have ﬁxed d. Either of these options raises, rather forcefully, the question,
what is a system, anyway? Taking the real world for granted is clearly insuﬃ-
cient for answering this question; just pointing to this and this and this does not
work either unless one is prepared to abandon language, including the mathemat-
ical language of the quantum-mechanical formalism, in its diachronic referential
role. Fuchs says very little about the nature of systems, except to imply that
any bounded part of the world, any real existence or in traditional non-QBist
language, any bounded collection of physical degrees of freedom counts as one:
every way of carving up every particular that is (p. 22) counts as a system, and
in every `hole' (every bounded region) there is an interiority not given by the rest
of the universe and a common quality called dimension (p. 25; parentheses in
original). If systems are real existences, then the boundaries that separate them
from the rest of the universe  from the environment in decoherence-theory ter-
minology  must be real existences too: they must physically keep dimension
in and keep deterministic causal inﬂuences out, providing the (at least partial)
isolation or interiority required for autonomy. Hence the question, what is a
system? becomes the question what is a system boundary? in QBism.
QBism is clearly not the only foundational approach that assumes physical sys-
tem boundaries that play a causal role: system boundaries deﬁne the regions
of Hilbert and typically physical space from which coherence is removed in de-
coherence theory. Zurek explicitly recognizes their problematic status, noting
that a compelling explanation of what the systems are ... would undoubtedly
be most useful (Zurek 1998, p. 1818) and in later papers postulating as ax-
iom(o) of quantum mechanics that systems exist (Zurek 2003, p. 746; Zurek
2007, p. 3). As in the case of system identiﬁcation by observers, the emergence
of a fundamental problem shared by foundational approaches as diametrically
opposed as QBism and quantum Darwinism suggests a deeper underlying issue:
it suggests that the assumption that systems and their boundaries are real ex-
istences, convenient as it is from a formal perspective, may be an error. In the
ordinary practice of science, after all, systems are routinely deﬁned as needed to
address particular problems; no one asks whether a particular boundary picking
out some subset of objects that happen to be of interest is real. Before the
advent of the environment as witness, decoherence was explained informally as
a consequence of the observer not looking at the environment (formally, tracing
the environment out of the density matrix), and hence losing the coherence
information that system-environment entanglement transferred to environmental
degrees of freedom (Zeh, 1970; Zeh, 1973; Zurek, 1981; Zurek, 1982; Joos/Zeh,
1985; Zeh, 2006). Fuchs lampoons the idea of observer-dependent decoherence
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(24, fn. 45), but in doing so commits himself to the view that all observer-
speciﬁed systems, whatever their purpose or shelf-life, are real existences with
real boundaries capable of preserving autonomy, i.e. keeping not just the prying
eyes of observers but the causal forces of the rest of the universe at bay. How this
view of systems and their d-preserving boundaries as real is to cope with the
profusion of arbitrarily bounded and arbitrarily overlapping systems postulated
ad hoc by observers, or with every particular that is and every way of carving up
every particular that is as deﬁned by Nature herself, is not made clear. As all
QBist systems are agents and hence observers, examining this question requires
better understanding the abilities that Fuchs attributes to observers.
4 What is a QBist observer?
Unlike most recent approaches to quantum foundations, QBism does not attempt
to remove the observer from the theory just as quickly as possible (p. 2) in or-
der to obtain an observer-independent formalism. QBist observers occupy center
stage in the theory, placing bets, acting on quantum systems with POVMs, and
experiencing unpredictable consequences. QBist observers are not passive recip-
ients of information, as they arguably are in quantum Darwinism, but active,
autonomous agents. For the QBist, the quantum mechanical formalism provides
a user's manual for decision-making agents immersed in a world of some yet to
be fully identiﬁed character (p. 23; emphasis in original) that contains normative
rules for calculating the probabilities of outcomes, in particular the Born Rule (p.
8, Fig. 2). Using this rule, an agent can calculate consistent sets of beliefs about
quantum systems (p. 4) and hence avoid bad outcomes (p. 8). The quantum
mechanical formalism is universal: It is a users' manual that any agent can pick
up and use to help make wiser decisions in this world of inherent uncertainty (p.
8; emphasis in original).
Fuchs does not explicitly deﬁne agent and insists that the notion of agent
... cannot be and should not be derivable from the quantum formalism itself
(p. 20) and more broadly that agency, for sure, is not a derivable concept
(p. 27). What counts in QBism as an agent must, therefore, be reconstructed
from Fuchs' characterizations of what agents do and how they do it. The ﬁrst
and most obvious question is, are all QBist agents quantum systems and hence
real existences? The idea that observers are themselves quantum systems and
can be treated theoretically as such dates back at least to von Neumann (1932)
and is taken for granted in most discussions of quantum foundations. Fuchs
appears to accept this notion, but then reject it: It will be noticed that QBism
has been quite generous in treating agents as physical objects when needed. `I
contemplate you as an agent when discussing your experience, but I contemplate
you as a physical system before me when discussing my own'  (p. 27). The term
contemplate suggests that Fuchs views the distinction between an agent and
a physical system to be a semantic distinction, a matter of interpretation. The
quoted passage is followed by one in which Fuchs acknowledges that all physical
systems are autonomous, and hence agent-like in QBism. As noted in Sect. 2,
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the universality of agency in QBism follows directly from Fuchs' postulate of
universal objective indeterminism as well as from his assumption of agency for
human observers via the Conway-Kochen theorem. It appears, then, that Fuchs
would be willing to grant that all agents are quantum systems, but only with the
provisos that (1) all quantum systems are agents, and (2) agent and quantum
system, even if co-extensive, have diﬀerent (unspeciﬁed) connotations within
QBism.
If all quantum systems are agents, any measurement interaction can be viewed
from either direction: a human observer monitoring the beam current in the LHC
using a PC can equally be viewed as the LHC monitoring the patience, interest,
knowledge, or some other property of the human being using the data server that
the PC accesses. Such reversibility raises the question of what is a system?
rather forcefully: we humans understand what it means for another human to
pick out the beam current in the LHC as a system of interest  at least we think
we do  but have no understanding of what it might mean for the LHC to pick
out a particular human being or that human being's apparent mental states as a
system of interest. Yet this is something that QBist agents do, and the LHC, like
every other bounded system in the universe, is a QBist agent. We humans also
understand  again, we think we do  what it means for a human agent to have a
belief, and to revise that belief given new data, but we do not understand what it
might mean for the LHC to have a belief. What is most odd, however, is the use
that the two agents make of the universal users' manual of quantum mechanics.
The LHC, and indeed all physical systems on which measurements have been
performed to date by us, appears to employ the manual perfectly; these systems
appear to place their bets and take action in exact accord with the normative
prescriptions of the Born rule, prescriptions which Fuchs insists any agent can
ignore if they choose (p. 8, Fig. 2 caption). Humans, on the other hand, are
lousy at quantum mechanics. Humans are notoriously bad at making probability
assignments that cohere with available data and applying Bayes' theorem even
in classical domains (e.g. Tversky/Kahneman 1974; Tversky/Kahneman 1981;
Pinker 1997). For all of our pride in our comparatively large values of d, we seem
to be dumber  at least, less coherent in our subjective probability assignments
 when it comes to QBist quantum mechanics than electrons.
The binary view of measurement interactions that Fuchs illustrates in his Fig.
1, however, leaves out the agent with the largest value of d: the rest of the uni-
verse. Fuchs explicitly considers the universe minus a particular agent to be a
quantum system about which that agent can have quantum information, devot-
ing all of Sect. VII to quantum cosmology. The universe minus two agents must
therefore be a quantum system as well, and hence be a third agent in its own
right, conducting continuous measurements on the agent and system of any
binary measurement interaction. The rest of the universe, like electrons but un-
like human beings, appears to be quite good at quantum mechanics, updating
its beliefs about what it observes and acting on the basis of these beliefs, as far
as we can tell, exactly in accord with the Born rule. Just as it does in decoher-
ence theory, the all-observing rest of the QBist universe acts as a witness to all
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binary measurement interactions. Fuchs scolds an imagined colleague who asks
what this world of inherent uncertainty is for God, saying trying to give him
a quantum state was what caused this trouble in the ﬁrst place (p. 8; emphasis
in original). Giving a quantum state, i.e. quantum information and the users'
manual to manipulate it, to the rest of the universe is, however, just as bad as
giving it to God. The consequences for QBism of the universe having access
to quantum information are best understood by comparing the QBist situation
to that in quantum Darwinism, where the environment as witness is explic-
itly embraced (Zurek, 2003; Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek, 2004; Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek,
2005; Blume-Kohout/Zurek, 2006; Zurek, 2009).
Let us return to the story of Wigner and his friend, and assume that Wigner's
friend is eﬀectively omniscient, at least about the present: he does not know
what either the system or Wigner will do next, but he knows everything else,
and performs every measurement continuously at the highest possible precision.
Under these conditions, the most eﬃcient way for Wigner to discover information
about the system of interest is to ask his friend. This is what happens in quantum
Darwinism: observers interact with their local fragments of the environment,
which encode information about systems of interest. For example, observers get
information about the positions of distant objects by interacting locally with
photons of ambient light that encode such positions. Environmental encodings
are massively redundant, and are assumed within the environment as witness
framework to be separable; hence many observers can interact with their local
environments simultaneously and arrive at a consensus about objective properties
of systems of mutual interest as discussed above. As is also discussed above,
such consensus building requires both that the observers agree in advance as to
what the system of mutual interest is and that they have system re-identiﬁcation
methods that commute with all other observables and work at least most of
the time (Fields, 2010; Fields, 2011). Advance agreement is required because
the observers have to ask the environment the right questions: the environment
simultaneously encodes the measurable properties of all possible systems, and it
does not, by assumption, know which of these systems the observers have agreed
to be interested in unless they tell it. Knowing what to ask the environment
amounts, however, to knowing in advance how the environment encodes the states
of every possible system of interest. Standard presentations of the environment
as witness formalism (Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek 2004; Ollivier/Poulin/Zurek 2005;
Blume-Kohout/Zurek 2006; Zurek 2007; Zurek 2009; see also Schlosshauer 2007;
Landsman 2007; Wallace 2008) miss this key point, as they treat observation
as binary and deﬁne the environment relative to a single pre-speciﬁed system of
interest. If the environment is deﬁned to be everything except, let us say, all
simply-connected solid objects larger than 1 mm3 within 1 km of the observer,
the problem of how a quantum Darwinist observer knows what she is looking at
leaps to the fore.
The situation is exactly the same in QBism. The rest of the universe becomes
Wigner's omniscient friend, who has assigned the most coherent probabilities pos-
sible to all possible outcomes, and keeps these probabilities updated continuously
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in exact accord with the Born rule. Anything Wigner himself could measure could
be found out, with better accuracy, simply by asking his friend. The probabilities
that the omniscient friend provides in response to questions are by assumption
optimally current and optimally coherent, and so are objective probabilities in
all but name, just the kind of probabilities that QBism rejects out of hand (pp.
47). Hence fully subjective probabilities can be saved, within QBism, only if it is
assumed that observers cannot ask the environment about the states of systems of
interest. This is the familiar QBist assumption of purely local interactions, but
with the emphasis on the requirement that these interactions be directly with
the systems of interest, not mediated by the environment acting as a channel,
and with the further taking for granted that QBist observers know what they
are looking at. The QBist environment is a witness to all interactions, but is a
witness with whom QBist observers are forbidden, in principle, to communicate.
The fundamental paradox of the QBist observer now becomes clear: if QBist
observers are physical systems, they cannot avoid interactions with the envi-
ronment, and hence cannot avoid the environment's selection of experiences in
reaction. An observer can choose to ignore the environment, as in early decoher-
ence theory, but cannot shield him/her/its-self from environmental interactions
and their eﬀects. An observer could assume, ad hoc and with no possibility of
supporting evidence, that the experiences induced by the environment as a whole
are identical to those induced by the system of interest, for every possible system
of interest. This is an extraordinarily strong assumption, since the environment
has by deﬁnition larger d than either the observer or the system being observed,
and in QBism d measures autonomy. The assumption that the environment is in
every case experientially transparent is thus an assumption that it is transparent
in spite of its inherent unpredictability. Absent such a seemingly unjustiﬁable
assumption, the environment can be made to disappear in Fuchs' Fig. 1 by
only one means: pulling the entire environment into the system of interest. This
solution is radical but eﬀective: every real existence  in non-QBist terms, ev-
ery collection of physical degrees of freedom  in the universe counts as a QBist
observer, and every QBist observer interacts with and hence forms beliefs about
exactly one system, the entire rest of his/her/its universe. The problems of di-
achronic system identiﬁcation and communication between observers vanish, as
does the problem of accommodating ﬁxed d. This solution is not solipsism; the
rest of the universe is real and is clearly distinct from the observer. It is,
however, intensely personal. QBist information is indeed information for me;
besides the observer and his/her/its personal world, nothing else exists.
The true status of the QBist observer reveals, as anticipated, the true QBist
ontology. Personal probabilities plus local interactions yield a purely-personal
world that is observer-dependent in the precise sense of comprising all of real
existence  all physical degrees of freedom  not contained within the observer.
This world includes a single boundary, the observer-environment boundary, at
which all interactions take place. From the perspective of the observer, the envi-
ronment is an autonomous agent and vice-versa. This ontology thus appears to
have all of the characteristics Fuchs desires. They come, however, at a price. The
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real world is maintained, but is rendered unrecognizable by the removal of all
boundaries except the one around the observer. This boundary-less world is as
holist as Everett's world; indeed, it is Everett's world, viewed from the perspec-
tive of a single observer. In a universe in which all systems are agents, the price
of personal probabilities is that the Einsteinian intuition of separability becomes
untenable.
Once again, what holds for QBism holds for quantum Darwinism, but for diﬀerent
reasons. Quantum Darwinist observers communicate only with their local envi-
ronments, i.e. only with their omniscient friends. Observations of local encodings
alone, however, are never suﬃcient to solve the reverse problem of determining
what properties of what distant systems have been encoded locally, as demon-
strated for the case of observers of classical ﬁnite automata by Moore (1956)
over 50 years ago and as taken for granted in algorithmic studies of perception
at least since the work of Marr (1982). Hence the boundaries of distant systems
can never be determined by a quantum Darwinist observer; such an observer can
assume separability, but this assumption has no operational meaning unless the
observer invokes Zurek's axiom(o) to declare that each local encoding that is en-
countered is an encoding of some property of a particular re-identiﬁable bounded
thing (Fields, 2010; Fields, 2011). Like the QBist assumption of an experientially
transparent environment, such axiomatic assumptions are ad hoc and unveriﬁable,
even in principle, and they rapidly approach utter incoherence when alternative
local encodings specify alternative system boundaries and hence competing inter-
pretations of what things are present in the world. Without such object-speciﬁc
axiomatic assumptions of thing-ness, the quantum Darwinist observer, like the
QBist observer, interacts simply with the world: all physical degrees of freedom
of the universe other than those contained in him/her/its-self.
5 Conclusion
QBism appears at ﬁrst glance to be, and is certainly presented by Fuchs as being,
an entirely new approach to quantum foundations in which non-determinism is
embraced as a virtue and the traditional foundational problems  in particular
the problem of non-locality  simply disappear. What has been shown here is
that this is an illusion. The foundational problems of quantum mechanics disap-
pear in QBism only because Fuchs steadfastly refuses to follow through on the
how does it work question, halting the explanation with the claim that systems
select the POVM components that observers experience. As soon as this ques-
tion is considered, the traditional problems emerge, in some cases with even more
virulence than they display in more standard approaches. QBism provides no
physical distinction between observers and the systems they observe, treating all
quantum systems as autonomous agents that respond to observations by updating
beliefs and employ quantum mechanics as a users' manual to guide behavior.
However, it treats observation itself as a physical process in which an observer
acts on a system with a POVM and the system selects a POVM component as
the observer's experience in return. This requirement renders the assumption
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that systems be well-deﬁned  i.e. have constant d  impossible to implement
operationally. It similarly forces the consistent QBist to regard the environment
as an eﬀectively omniscient observer, threatening the fundamental assumption of
subjective probabilities and forcing the conclusion that QBist observers cannot
segment their environments into objectively separate systems.
What is of even greater interest than the emergence of familiar problems in a
new context, however, is that the virulent versions of these problems revealed by
QBism can also be found lurking just behind their more familiar manifestations
even in more traditional interpretative approaches, and in particular in quantum
Darwinism. As noted earlier, quantum Darwinism is about as far from QBism in
terms of advertised assumptions as one can get. If the present analysis is correct,
QBism and quantum Darwinism share an apparently intractable problem with
diachronic system identiﬁcation, and are both driven to an ontological stance in
which, absent indefensibly strong ad hoc assumptions, the boundaries of external
systems vanish, leaving the observer interacting with an undiﬀerentiated personal
universe. Shared deep problems suggest a shared implicit assumption, and the
shared implicit assumption in this case appears to be that diachronic system
identiﬁcation is possible as a matter of objective, physical fact. If this assumption
is wrong, separability has no objective meaning. Physics has come to accept
and even to productively employ non-locality in the form of carefully-regulated
entanglement (Nielsen/Chaung, 2000; Deutsch, 1985; Galindo/Martin-Delgado,
2001; Gisin, 2005); perhaps it can be formulated in a way that also accepts
and derives insight from the notion of a universe in which separability plays no
objective role.
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